

Defense & Foreign Affairs

A photograph of a man in a dark suit, white shirt, and striped tie, looking off to the side. In the background, the Big Ben clock tower in London is visible against a clear blue sky.

Monarchy's New Rôle

*"Not all the water in the rough rude sea
Can wash the balm from an annointed
king."*

— *William Shakespeare, King Richard II.*

The Purple Banner's Stream

A growing tide of sentiment in many states is reviving the discussion on the rôle of the monarchy in politics in the 21st Century. It is, however, a subject which has been long neglected by constitutionalists and political thinkers, despite the fact that the various forms of monarchies now in existence have adapted extremely well — albeit quietly and subtly — to the changing times.

*Editor-in-Chief **Gregory Copley** begins the debate on the place of monarchy in today's, and tomorrow's, governments.*



"The King never dies."

Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780) said in his Commentaries on the Laws of England:

Good government — that is, the creation and management of a stable, prosperous and productive society — in the end is only possible through goodwill: the goodwill of the governed and the goodwill of the governors. Any system of government may become diminished by the mediocrity, intellectual impoverishment, ill-will, endemic lack of judgement, or greed of its exponents. And any system which fails to flower from roots buried deep and long within the society which it is to govern will not long retain the goodwill of its peoples. Only force and fear enable government to remain in office without the active endorsement of its people.

These are the imprecise foundations with which ideologues must wrestle. And with society's increasing sophistication and complexity in most countries of the world, the attempt by constitutionalists has been to codify the national goodwill and societal roots of government into democratic or other measurable (and also increasingly complex) forms of public accountability for government and governed alike.

Now, however, in contrast to this, existing monarchical governments are again gaining in popularity and there is a tendency towards the restoration of monarchies which had been overthrown earlier in this century. This tendency is clearly not so noticeable in those states which have not for many years (or ever) been under monarchical or hereditary government. Nor is it so clear in those states which today have functioning monarchies; there the habit of royalty is part of everyday life. But the talk of restoration is most

Previous pages:
Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, sovereign of 10 states and Head of the Commonwealth.

Right: Libyan heir apparent, His Royal Highness Prince Idris al-Sanusi, stands beneath Churchill's statue during a recent visit to London.





His Majesty King Hussein ibn Talal of Jordan talks with His Majesty Sultan Qabus bin Sa'id al bu Sa'id of Oman.

active in those countries which lost their monarchies to totalitarian or autocratic rule in this century.

There are today, according to the 1990 edition of *Defense & Foreign Affairs Handbook*, 62 states, territories or colonies under monarchical rule out of the total of 222 such entities in the world. Of these, four are in Africa, 20 are in the Western Hemisphere, 13 are in Europe, seven are in Asia, 10 are in Oceania, and eight are in Arabia.

A significant number of the world's wealthiest or economically most advanced industrial states are currently thriving under monarchical forms of government. Japan, Britain, Canada, Australia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, etc. are included in this category, while other major raw material states — Saudi Arabia being an important example — also are prospering under monarchies.

There are, in addition, other states — such as Nigeria, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates and South Africa — where hereditary royal families hold considerable sway and/or legal authority over subsidiary parts of the national populations.

Moreover, there are at least a dozen states in which the restoration of the monarchy is under active consideration by a sufficiently large sectors of the populations to make discussion of the subject important. Despite this, there has been no ac-

tive debate in recent years on the concepts driving the evolution of modern monarchical forms of government, even in light of evidence that monarchies have in the past two centuries (and particularly in the 20th Century) proven capable of subtle and almost imperceptible adaptation to change in society, in the sense that society has not been dislocated by the changes in the system.

Sing Farouk, that notably unsuccessful ruler of Egypt who failed to change with his people, made the comment after his overthrow that by the end of the 20th Century there would only be five royal houses left in business: those of Clubs, Diamonds, Hearts, Spades and Windsor.

It is true that the House of Windsor, which rules the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and many Commonwealth states, is flourishing as the end of the Century draws near. But in predicting that no others would survive, King Farouk was as lamentable in this insight as he was in all other insights on government.

There is a general assumption that monarchies tend to be more conservative forms of government, and that monarchs are more conservative in themselves than their elected counterparts in republican

administrations. This, however, is not necessarily born out through history. The great US social scientist, Pitirim Sorokin, in a study entitled *Monarchs and Rulers: a Comparative Statistical Study*, published in *Social Forces* in March 1926, noted that the average age of ascent to the throne was 31.1 years. He measured 300 monarchs' records to achieve that measure. The average age of ascent for US presidents, on the other hand, was (until that time) 55 years of age, and 59.5 years of age for French presidents.

"This suggests the following conclusion," Sorokin said: "Insofar as the greater age is connected with greater conservatism, the system of recruiting presidents and other executives of State . . . through election, tends to select the more balanced and conservative people than the system of social inheritance of a social position [ie: monarchs]."

It was, however, noted by Sorokin that hereditary rulers tended to hold their posts longer than elected leaders; some 32 percent of monarchs studied reigned longer than 19 years, and nearly 58 percent reigned longer than nine years, compared with the usual two-term US president's tenure of eight years. And to those who have argued that the system of monarchical rule is inequitable in that it denies the top position to "upstarts", not of royal blood, Sorokin noted that the position of monarch has not traditionally been closed to these "upstarts". But the percentage of these within monarchical societies fluctuates from time to time, from country to country.

"In some countries," Sorokin said, "it was as high as the percent of presidents of democracies who came out of the poor and humble families."

For much of the past 70 years, it has been assumed to one degree or another that "communist" governments were all alike; that they subscribed to the same tenets; that they governed by the same guidelines and in the same fashion; that they were all of one "club". History has resoundingly debunked that myth. Indeed, it has become clear, despite the more-or-less similar rhetoric associated with so-called communist

governments, that the only common element between them is that they each have ruled to one degree or another without either expressed popular consent or without the historical legitimacies normally associated with traditional governmental forms.

Non-elective, pseudo-ideological governments tend to take almost extreme measures to create an atmosphere of legitimacy; that legitimacy which is taken for granted in systems of government which are rooted in *social* legitimacy. Monarchy, whether partially or wholly deriving from an hereditary process, has enjoyed exactly that legitimacy since man first adopted an hierarchical process of society, and when its gatherings automatically selected and then revered a leader.

J. R. Tanner, the constitutional historian of St. John's College, Cambridge, noted: "The existence of the Crown serves to *disguise* change and therefore deprive it of the evil consequences of revolution." In this observation he echoed the famous Victorian constitutionalist Walter Bagehot.

There are today no monarchical states which bear any meaningful similarity to the priest-kings of tribal days. The monarchical forms of government — and I refer to the multiple forms of monarchy — have evolved even more than the purely republican forms have developed since the Athenian experiments. But both of these forms are diametrically opposite from the absolutist forms of autocracy which were displayed by Adolph Hitler or Joseph Stalin in the 20th Century.

So where does all of this lead us? Of primary importance is the realization that we have been forced for almost a century to waste time studying the supposed meaning of transitory dogma, such as "national socialism" and "scientific socialism" at the expense of studying the

evolution — and the evolutionary possibilities — of democratic and/or representative and rooted forms of government including monarchical government.

The 20th Century political or ideological preoccupation will seem as arcane several centuries hence as the priestly rites of the pharaonic temples during the worship of Osiris.



His Majesty King Fahd bin 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia: promoting the case for "progressive monarchy".

So, to return to the theme, to what point *has* the monarchical tradition of rule evolved? The first few decades of this century saw a flowering of many old, and some new, monarchies. The modern communications of the post industrial revolution era, coupled with the European consolidations of Napoleon and World War I, saw fairly substantial kingdoms emerge, some to succumb to a series of violent overthrows at the hands of the Third Reich and then the Soviets.

We have witnessed the destruction of the Third Reich, and today we see the USSR withdrawing its claim over many of the former monarchies of Central Europe. Once again, the question of a partial or complete democratic monarchical

restoration is being raised in such states as Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, and even Hungary. There are many steps which must be taken before such a situation occurs, however. Nonetheless, as the ruins of communism are seen in these states, there are many — including those who were not yet born when their monarchs departed — who can see the disparity between the drab, recently passed decades and the more optimistic periods under their kings.

But before even examining the prospect for re-instituting those Central European monarchies, it is worth looking at where the remaining monarchies — those which never departed — have developed.

King Farouk of Egypt was correct when he identified the House of Windsor as the stalwart reigning monarchy at the close of the 20th Century. Not only does the Head of the House of Windsor, Queen Elizabeth II, act as Head of the Commonwealth, she is also Sovereign of a significant number of the world's 62 monarchically led states, territories or colonies. All of

the 20 monarchies in the Western Hemisphere claim Elizabeth II as their head of state.


Nine Commonwealth states apart from the United Kingdom recognize Queen Elizabeth II as their Sovereign separately and independent of her rôle and title as Queen Elizabeth II of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, The Bahamas, Mauritius, Barbados, Jamaica and Grenada each accord her the title of Queen of their own state. Fiji's *coups d'état* in 1987, although aimed at resolving domestic ethnic problems, resulted in such a range of pressures from the British, Australian and New Zealand governments that Fiji's interim military rulers were compelled much against

their will to transform the country into a republic, thereby ending the rule of Queen Elizabeth II as the Sovereign of Fiji. Significantly, the Fijian people's loyalty to the House of Windsor has remained undiminished and the Fijian Government has consistently probed a way to return Queen Elizabeth to the throne of Fiji. It is equally significant that the Indian Government, which claims the rôle of protector of those Fijians who can trace their ancestry to the South Asian subcontinent, has used its power in the Commonwealth to veto a return by Fiji to the Commonwealth. This has effectively stymied Fiji's bid to bring back Queen Elizabeth as the country's sovereign.

Fiji has discussed the resurrection in a formal political rôle of the country's own hereditary monarchies, those three paramount chieftaincies which handed power voluntarily to Queen Victoria in 1874. The three paramount chieftaincies retain their effective power within the Fijian political and social structure, and it was suggested as recently as 1989 that a fourth confederacy of chiefs be created in the Western District of Fiji — which had been unrepresented by the three major paramount chieftaincies — in order to have a more national system representing the hereditary rulers of the people down to village level. One suggestion being considered was for these four paramount chiefs then to elect a national king on a more-or-less rotating basis as is the case among the hereditary sultans of Malaysia.

In Canberra, the Australian Parliament was anxious that the British connections of the monarchy did not interfere with the country's burgeoning sense of identity and, in a bid to cut what was perceived as an unseemly tie to the British judicial system, passed the Australia Act in 1986. This terminated the ability of the UK Parliament to pass laws affecting Australia, and ended Aus-

tralian appeal to the House of Lords as the highest court open to Australians. It should be borne in mind that this happened 85 years after Federation — independence — in Australia, and the final severing of the umbilical cord with Britain seems only to have strengthened the position of the Australian monarchy which at least to some degree can now be seen as just that: an *Austra-*



His Imperial Majesty Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran: he forgot the tenets of Persian rule and lost his throne.

lian monarchy, with no implication of legal subservience by Australia to the British Parliament.

The underlying bonds which a majority of Australians, New Zealanders and Canadians, for example, retain for their monarch may stem to a large degree from the common ethnic roots which bound many of their forefathers to the British Crown. But it may to an even greater degree depend on the unbroken line of symbols which have been woven *loosely* between monarchs and subjects over centuries. The crown may lie heavy at times upon the brow of the sovereign, but it does not lie heavy on the heads of those Commonwealth subjects who

claim the House of Windsor as their own.

This may be part of the secret of the endurance and success of the British monarchy during the periods of stress which saw several dynasties usurped in the 20th Century. Constitutional monarchy, such as that practiced by the House of Windsor and the royal houses of Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, places the onus for government on the parliaments elected by the people. The sovereign is, from the public viewpoint, then freed of the day-to-day vicissitudes of government and is free to lead and inspire. As *Time* magazine noted on January 5, 1953, of Queen Elizabeth II: she possesses the power to "represent, express and effect the aspirations of the collective subconscious". But in fact, to varying degrees within constitutional monarchies, the sovereign provides the final arbitration as to what an elected government may or may not do.

This was amply demonstrated in Australia's constitutional crisis of 1975 when the Queen's Representative in Australia — the Governor-

General, Sir John Kerr — dismissed Prime Minister Gough Whitlam when his Government had failed to obtain funding approval from the Senate for the Government's budget. Although this was clearly a complex issue and one handled more directly than it would have been in a British situation, the message of the monarch's constitutional power was clear: the sovereign retains the right to dismiss parliament, and this is perhaps the greatest of the powers retained by the British (and Australian, etc.) Crown.

But is the constitutional power which is retained by Western monarchs their most potent aspect? Or is it the intangible aspect of hereditary

office which grasps at the core of society, and which has unsuccessfully been dismissed by the advocates of quantitative government? Emile Durkheim was quoted as saying: "There can be no society which does not regularly feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which make its unity and personality."

Much of this "intangible" is expressed in symbols and rituals, and it may be claimed that this is a throwback to the castes of priest-kings. It is more likely, however, that the phenomenon merely shares the innate desire of almost all humans for uplifting symbols of leadership, hope, societal guidance and the like. It is no accident that publics look to religion *and* to their monarchs — even if these are sometimes the almost mythical monarchies of the past — for guidance; and so it is no wonder that the images of monarchies are often intertwined with that of religion.

Modern political theorists have placed religion to one side when discussing the question of temporal power. This has largely been the result of the school of thinking which can only account for *tangibles*, such as "scientific socialism"; if it cannot be measured, it cannot be valid. And yet history has proven this pseudo-scientific approach to be without foundation. The most potent component of power is in fact the intangible element: the charisma of a leader, the mysticism of duty.

Even the proponents of "scientific socialism" strayed from the purely "scientific" when they pre-empted the symbolism of a most royal color — red — to stir the masses. And they sought to recreate the legitimacy of hereditary rulers, not so much by claiming a *past* lineage, but by claiming a *future* lineage. It was a novel concept, but man's psyche is conditioned to accept the suggestions of genealogy rather than the promise of the "scientists" of that even less-tangible element, the future.

Today we see, almost three-quarters of a century after the Russian Revolution began, an attempt by nations which had been swept up in

that movement and its subsequent power to reassert the traditional values and identities which had apparently been subsumed into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The mysticism and roots of the past transcended the 73 years of communism. There has been a revival of Russian nationalism within the Russian part of the USSR, just as their has been a revival of Georgian nationalism in Georgia. And talk of a revival — most likely extremely premature — of the monarchies of both nations. And yet such revivals cannot be ruled out.

King Charles II of Britain was placed on the throne 11 years after Cromwell's parliamentarians had defeated and beheaded Charles I at Whitehall. Japan's emperor, whose office had been in abeyance for *seven centuries*, was restored to power and apparently divine authority by the highly gifted Prince Ito in 1889.

"To our Western minds it seems illogical that an institution which had remained in abeyance for seven centuries should suddenly be revived and be able to acquire a glamor and a prestige that dated from the tenth century," the famous monarchical chronicler Harold Nicolson said in his book *Kings, Courts and Monarchies* in 1962. And yet exactly such a restoration was achieved.

But even the Japanese Imperial restoration is perhaps not as remarkable as the use of similar historical allegory to recreate the State of Israel after some 2,000 years. It is ironic that the recreation of the State of Israel was achieved through the herculean efforts of Zionists, most of whom were socialists bent on creating a "modern state" in which the tangibles of modern societies were paramount: the structure and economic standards which were taken to be immutable. But to recreate the state, they relied on the same potent symbols of nationhood, religion and mysticism which underlie man's fascination with hereditary government.

This fascination has been amply evident in "communist" Yugoslavia during the past year or so. The Yugoslav federation, comprising a number of diverse ethnic, linguistic,

religious and often historically hostile groups, had been bound together since World War II exclusively by the force of rule of Marshal Tito and his form of communism. It is significant that the "legitimacy" of communism was of insufficient force to bind the state after Tito's death. Today there is considerable talk of a restoration of the Yugoslav monarchy as being one of the few hopes for retaining unity among the diverse federal components.

The several visits to Yugoslavia by Princess Jelisaveta Karadjordjevic — the daughter of the country's last Regent, Prince Pavle — in 1989 and 1990 have had a significant effect. As the Belgrade newspaper *Politika* noted in its April 28-May 4, 1990, edition: "Princess Jelisaveta Karadjordjevic and the protesting miners from Zenica were in the Yugoslav Parliament at the same time. That is one of Yugoslavia's realities. Another reality is that the Princess drew by far more attention than the miners did."

The same edition of the newspaper carried what can only be described as a euphoric account of an interview of Princess Jelisaveta (or Princess Elisabeth of Yugoslavia, as she is known internationally) by *Politika* correspondent Mike Niketic. The adulation with which Princess Jelisaveta was received in Yugoslavia — even to the rapt applause she received when she entered parliament — comes at a time of a major national return to democracy and free speech.

It is ironic that the princess's cousin, Crown Prince Alexander, son of the country's last king — Peter — has refused to visit Yugoslavia until the "present regime" has gone. He may find that he will have missed an opportunity as Greece's King Constantine did when he failed to return to his country after the departure of the military from government in 1974.

Today, Constantine sits in London when, with a little risk and a little leadership he could have been back on his throne in Athens. But even in Greece it may not be too late for the monarchy to play its rôle



His Majesty King Juan Carlos I of Spain with (then) US President Ronald Reagan.

again. Certainly Greece is no stranger to the phenomenon of sudden change in the status of its royalty: the 30-year feud between the Venizelists and the Royalists saw the country fluctuate between republic and monarchy almost the entire period between World War I and World War II.

In London, Crown Prince Alexander of Yugoslavia comments cautiously: "If the Yugoslav people should at a future time wish a restoration of the monarchy I will give the question deep consideration." But the situation in Yugoslavia differs from that in Greece; Yugoslavia's federal structure could collapse into independent component parts unless some central leadership emerges. Alexander may find his caution perceived as reticence or rejection, and neither he nor the Yugoslav people may find out whether he could or could not

restore the throne. On the other hand, they may turn to his cousin who has taken up the challenge and gone back to Yugoslavia.

Romania, too, ponders the question of a possible restoration of the monarchy, but the post-Ceausescu leadership, while nominally offering free elections, was (in May 1990) still firmly stalinist. King Mihai I (King Michael I) was turned back when he tried in April 1990 to re-enter his country after 43 years in exile. He remains in exile, a potent symbol to the current Romanian Government which clearly sees the virility of sentiment in favor of the monarchy even after four decades of its absence. Much of the current Government's concern over what had become, officially, a forgotten monarch stemmed from the surprisingly intense greeting which awaited King Mihai's two daughters to Romania.

Today, both daughters still visit the country — already in the few months since Ceausescu was overthrown they have become too popular for the Government to insist on their return to exile — where they have been organizing convoys to import medical and other emergency supplies into their country from Western Europe. King Mihai addressed a British Parliamentary committee on April 2, 1990, and concluded with the reminder:

"The reconstruction of the European continent is an immense challenge, entailing many difficult and long-term problems. Yet it is a task which has become unavoidable now that the Iron Curtain has collapsed. There is no need to look back with nostalgia to the period before 1989, when everything was simple and supposedly stable, *because it was not* [italics as stated]. The problems which Eastern Europe is facing today are essentially the very same ones it faced when I was forced to leave my country — at the point of a gun — in 1947: national identity, military security, economic reconstruction, guarantees to national borders and foreign trade. The task is unavoidable and I am ready to serve the interests of my country in their solution. My sincere hope is that, as Romania confronts these difficulties, it will find many friends in the West. Another European country is extending its arms to you: please be ready to respond."

And if debate is now well advanced on the subject of the return of the monarchy in Romania and Yugoslavia, it is also at least up for discussion in Albania and Bulgaria, two of the more reticent countries in Eastern Europe's sweeping era of changes. The communist daily *Zeri i Popullit* in Tiranë in January 1990 accused exiles of trying to foment an uprising to restore the monarchy. The newspaper, speaking for the Government, said that there was a plan to put Prince Leka, the son of former King Zog, on the throne. "As a result of the changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe, the rightist circles and chieftains of the

Continued on Page 24

The Purple Banner's Stream

Continued from Page 13

Greek Orthodox Church thought the time had come to intervene in Albania," *Zeri i Popullit* said.

Prince Leka, meanwhile, has said that his government-in-exile plans to start radio broadcasts to prepare for an uprising against the stalinist Government of Albania.

Exiled monarchs are being recalled to service in one way or another outside Europe, too. The al-Sanusi House, overthrown by Col. Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi in 1969 in Libya, is now, after 21 years, closer than ever to the restoration of the Libyan throne. Ironically, the current Libyan situation — that is, the chance for a return of the monarchy — also owes much to the changes in Eastern Europe. Libyan leader Qadhafi had, for most of his two decades in power, owed his personal security to the support of the USSR, support which was suddenly withdrawn by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, who felt that the Soviet Union could no longer afford the cost and embarrassment of propping up the mercurial Qadhafi.

So today Qadhafi's grasp on Libya is reduced to how much he can count on his 6,000 to 8,000 personal bodyguards (and ensuring that the Armed Forces are deprived of ammunition, fuel for their vehicles and even normal contact between officers and men). At the same time, the sprawling al-Sanusi Royal Family has — for the first time since 1969 — come together with a surprising unity of purpose to back Prince Idris al-Sanusi as heir apparent to his great-uncle, the late King Idris I.

The years in exile have made Idris and his brothers and cousins into well-educated, erudite thinking men. Idris, 33, speaks five languages fluently and is comfortable with the way in which the successful monarchical systems have molded them-

selves to accommodate modern society. Like King Mihai I of Yugoslavia, Prince Idris also addressed a British Parliamentary committee in April 1990. And like King Mihai, he exhibited an identification with the *people*, rather than the power, from whom he has been separated for some decades. Prince Idris and his cousins were due to talk to US political audiences in May 1990, attempting to carry the anti-Qadhafi cause to Libyans and foreigners alike.

Prince Idris, a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed and therefore a spiritual leader as well as a temporal one in Libya, walks a fine line between his devotion to democratic monarchical structures and traditional Middle Eastern monarchy. But he is sensitive toward the traditional rôles of leaders in the Middle East.

Indeed, the success in the past few decades of the monarchies in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain owes much to the skill with which the hereditary monarchs have been able to identify with, and understand, their peoples. The West has been, as noted earlier, preoccupied with the notion that the relationship between governed and governors must be electorally quantifiable, an approach which has — as the voting franchise extends wider and wider — tended to bring politicians (ie: leaders) down to the lower reaches of society. Without diminishing the reach to the lowest levels of society, monarchies have tended to uplift all elements of the population rather than sink into vote-winning populism.

The great identification of the British working classes with their monarchs and Royal Family is testament to that sentiment. During the British constitutional crisis of 1938, the first suggestions that King Edward VIII might leave the throne brought protestors into the streets with placards reading such things as "Hands off our King. Abdication means revolution".

The successful identification of the current array of Middle Eastern monarchs with their people has led to popular representation of the

public through various institutions and customs, not all of which accord with Western ideals of democracy. Nonetheless, they do in large measure reflect popular wishes and tend to concern themselves more with the good of the people than with the personal acquisition of power which is associated with non-hereditary dictators.

The failure of the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran in 1978-79 aptly portrays the failure of the Emperor, the late Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to identify with his people. The Shah was coerced with greater and greater pressure by the United States Government (particularly then-President Jimmy Carter and his wife) to adopt a more "democratic" approach to government. And the Shah's own desire to transform Iran into a major Western economic state also led him to strive for a more open approach to government. It was this, ironically, which caused the schism between the throne, the clergy and the people. He lost the strength which the Iranian people traditionally demand from their kings, appeared to be a vascillating and alien leader, and was thus deposed.

Ironically, the Persians were one of the pioneers of elective monarchy; the Arsacids reigned over the Parthian Kingdom in post-Alexandrian Persia for almost five centuries. Their kings built their winter capital in Ctesithon (20 miles southeast of present Baghdad, Iraq) in Mesopotamia, and their summer capital in Ecbatana, capital of the old Median empire.

They had two parliamentary bodies: the Mahestan, or upper house, elected basically by the elite and nobles; and the Kahestan, the lower house or *majlis*, whose delegates were elected by commoners. The king was elected by the Mahestan, usually for life.

The concept of the monarchy is still very much alive in Iran, although as the seizure of the throne in 1925 by the Pahlavis (from the Qajar dynasty) shows, it may not necessarily be the uncrowned Shah Reza, now in exile, who sits next on the Peacock Throne. The idea of monarchical restoration in Iran may be

moving faster than the exiled son of the late Shah Mohammad Reza unless he acts soon.

In neighboring Afghanistan, the concept of a restoration of the monarchy under the former king, Mohamad Zahir Shah (deposed by his cousin, Prince Daud Khan in July 1973), has already been strongly mooted. Among the principal advocates of this are the Soviets, who have for seven decades been viewed as the principal architects of the anti-monarchical movement. It should be seen as no surprise that, as Soviet influence on the Afghan Administration of President Najibullah wanes, the influence of nearby India rises. India is already providing considerable military support to Najibullah in his war against the *Mujahedin*, a fight which India sees as a proxy war against Pakistan. And India would under no circumstances countenance a restoration of the Afghan monarchy if it could persuade Najibullah to think otherwise.

The Indian Government's apparent xenophobia toward monarchies itself is not surprising. Any trend toward a restoration of royal rule in South Asia could inspire yearnings in those princely states which now constitute such a large part of the Indian state. The Indian Government, indeed, so concerned about the power which the princes, maharajahs and the like retained in the late 1940s, completely abrogated the terms of the agreements by which these monarchs brought their formerly independent states into the Indian Union. Today, India maintains its antipathy toward the remaining non-Indian monarchies in South Asia, and India's hand in the current crisis besetting the Nepalese throne is less than subtle.

There is insufficient space here to undertake comparative studies of the various approaches to government adopted by the world's current monarchies, or even to look at the success and vitality of the smaller monarchies such as Luxembourg, Monaco, Liechtenstein, Tonga and the like. These must be the subject of separate articles.

A study of the possible place of the monarchy in Brazil is also war-

ranted, given the fact that a national plebiscite should take place in that country in 1993 to determine whether it continues as a republic or reverts to a monarchy. The current pretender to the Brazilian throne, Dom Pedro Gastão — great-grandson of deposed Emperor Dom Pedro II — is now 80 years old. A São Paulo newspaper in 1989 conducted a poll which showed that a fifth of the Brazilian population favored restoration, 104 years after Dom Pedro II was deposed.

What is vitally important to modern political discussion is the realization that there is a growing trend toward the restoration of monarchies in those states where such institutions had earlier roots. The success of the Spanish monarchical restoration in 1975 should serve as an historical guidepost.

Indeed, the whole question of the future of European monarchies needs to be analyzed in the light of the forthcoming European union of 1992. It is all very well for the present national parliaments to subordinate their functions to a centralized European Parliament, but will public sentiment allow the national monarchies of Great Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Luxembourg to be swallowed up by a European political creature? Or will European centralism create a response whereby smaller cultural units — more aligned to the older geographic units — bring about a revival of such monarchies as the King of Prussia or the Landgrave of Hesse.

For that matter, the question of the rôle (not necessarily the restoration) of the monarchy in Hungary must be analyzed. There has been discussion of a place for Hungary's hereditary king in a republican office. Ironically, Hungary's present pretender is Otto von Hapsburg, heir to the Austro-Hungarian Imperial throne, which includes the kingdom of Hungary, among other states. The options and topics for discussion and analysis regarding Europe's monarchies are now urgent and far-ranging.

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Perhaps what is most significant today is the fact that the differences between modern constitutional monarchies and modern democratic republics are not as great as those who live in republics seem, without reflection, to believe.

monarchies and modern democratic republics are not as great as those who live in republics seem, without reflection, to believe. Most of the same freedoms and democratic rights — and even processes — exist in, say, the Western European monarchies as exist in, for example, the United States of America. But it could be argued that the monarchies afford their people an even greater identification with their head-of-state than elections give to the presidents of republics. After all, what percentage of the US public votes in a presidential election? And of that percentage, what percentage votes for the winning candidate?

The argument that no-one "votes" for a European monarch does not hold water. Which European monarchy has outstayed its popular support? Indeed, if we may look at Sweden, where a part of the socialist government has successively tried to strip the monarchy of its luster, the reverse is the case: any attempt by Parliament to eliminate the monarchy would almost certainly end the life of that government.

Let the debate begin.

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